
A Quick Disclaimer: Backstory & Strategy is a personal, independent publication. The views, analysis, and commentary expressed here are strictly my own and do not represent the official position, strategy, or endorsement of the American Press Institute, its leadership, or its board. This is my personal space for analyzing the media landscape, testing new frameworks, and thinking out loud.
Someone asked me recently why anyone would want to lead a public media organization right now. TV, radio, or both, given everything stacked against it.
It was a fair question, and it wasn’t asked with any cynicism. The person genuinely wanted to know. So I took a deep breath and gave the answer I’d used for seven years at Lehigh Valley Public Media, the one I must have said in a hundred staff meetings, board retreats, and donor lunches.
“Because it’s essentially a 60-year-old startup.”
For most of those seven years, that line got a knowing laugh. People understood it as a reframe, a way of saying stop thinking of this place as a utility and start thinking of it as something you get to build. It was how we justified launching a nightly newscast and a digital newsroom at an organization whose identity was built around a transmitter. It was also how I tried to bridge a gap I heard constantly. Staff would ask, reasonably, why a nonprofit needed to talk so much about margins. The board’s answer was always the same: no money, no mission.
This time, the line didn’t get a laugh. It got a pause.
That’s because it’s not a metaphor anymore. With the federal floor gone, every public media station in the country is now doing the one thing startups do: figuring out, in real time and with real stakes, whether what it offers is worth paying for. The only difference is that these startups come with 60 years of inheritance, and not all of it is an asset.
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The Rescue Business
For most of its history, public media has sold itself as something that needs saving.
I traced that history in an earlier piece. The “only you can save” appeal took shape during pledge drives in the 1970s, and it worked for decades. There’s an irony in the origin story: pledge drives took off in the first place largely because of CPB funding cutbacks. The rescue business was born of a federal cut, and now it’s facing the biggest one yet.
It’s a powerful message because it’s partly true. Without viewers and listeners giving, the station really would go dark. But over time it turned into something more than a fundraising line. It became how public media understood its own business. We weren’t selling anything. We were asking to be rescued, over and over, on a schedule.
That posture shaped everything else. If the business is rescue, margins feel beside the point. You make the case, the community responds, and the mission continues. “No money, no mission” was a quiet argument that we needed a different business model, even if nobody put it that way at the time.
Here’s the problem with rescue as a strategy. Nobody builds a rescue. They fund one, and only for as long as the emergency feels real. Startups don’t get to operate that way. They have to find something people value enough to support without being reminded that the lights might go out. The question public media now faces isn’t whether its communities will save it again. It’s whether it can become something they choose to keep.
The Gap Nobody Had to Name
Every public media station I know can tell you what its community needs. It’s in the grant applications, the strategic plans, and the local content and service reports that went to CPB every year. We got very good at describing need. Underserved counties, missing coverage, kids without access to early learning, towns where the newspaper had already gone quiet. None of it was exaggerated. Most of it was true.
What almost nobody could tell you was what their community could afford.
That was never a moral failure. It was a structural one. Federal money sat in the middle of the budget and quietly absorbed the difference between what a place needed and what it could pay for. For some stations it was a sliver of revenue. For others it was far more. In fiscal 2023, almost half of rural stations relied on CPB for at least a quarter of their revenue, and 33 of them, many on Native American reservations, relied on it for half or more. Either way, federal money let us build to the need without ever reconciling it with the market. The gap existed, but it never had to show up in a board meeting.
I felt the edges of it at Lehigh Valley Public Media. When staff asked why a nonprofit needed to talk so much about margins, they were really asking why the need wasn’t enough of an argument on its own. “No money, no mission” was the right answer. But even we were working with a number that had federal dollars baked in. We were all sizing the organization against a floor we hadn’t poured ourselves.
I should be honest about my own part in that. I helped build a nightly newscast and a digital newsroom, and I’m still proud of both. It was the right work, and it met a real need in a region that was losing local coverage fast. But I built it the way public media taught me to build: need first, market later. I made the case for what the Lehigh Valley deserved much more carefully than I measured what it would sustain. Some of what I built has since been scaled back. That's hard to watch, and it's also the math catching up. If I built it again, I’d start with the math.
That floor is gone now, and what’s underneath is uncomfortable. None of it should have come as a surprise: public media had a half-century of warnings and still wasn’t ready. One analysis of station finances by Semipublic estimates that about 15% of local stations are at risk of closing within three years because of the cuts. The loss of federal funding didn’t just take money out of public media. It took away the thing that let us avoid a question every other kind of organization has to answer first. The lost revenue is painful, but it’s the exposure that changes the job.
This is where the startup comparison stops being a pep talk and starts being useful. A founder doesn’t begin with what the world needs. Plenty of things are needed and never get built, because nobody will pay for them in the form they’re offered. A founder begins with who will pay, how much, and how often, and then decides what size of company that market can hold. The mission shapes what gets built. The market decides how big it gets to be.
Public media has always run that sequence in reverse, and for nearly 60 years it could afford to.
A startup sizes the market. Public media sizes the need.
What Enough Looks Like
Before any of that math works, a station has to answer a question most never ask: where is the market, exactly? For decades we’ve let the signal answer it. If the transmitter reaches a county, that county is ours to serve, to cover, to raise money in, to show up for. I’d call it geographic blindness, and I learned about it the hard way. When I started a nightly newscast covering 10 counties across 5,600 square miles of northeastern Pennsylvania and New Jersey, we saw one connected region. Advertisers, sponsors, and donors saw a collection of separate communities. The geographic ambition we thought was our strength was quietly undercutting our ability to raise support. The contour tells you where people can watch. It says nothing about where your journalism matters most, where your relationships are deepest, or where anyone will ever write you a check. A startup never confuses its reach with its market. Public media has been doing it since the first tower went up.
Once you know where the market is, the next question is how you’d measure it. It’s less mysterious than it sounds. It’s mostly work we’ve never been asked to do.
Start with households. Every service area has a real giving capacity: how many people give to anything, at what levels, and how often. Public media has always counted its own members closely and looked much less at the pool they come from. A station that knows it has 20,000 members but doesn’t know how many households in its core market give $100 or more a year to any cause isn’t measuring its market. It’s measuring its market share without knowing the size of the market.
Then look at institutions. Every region has a finite set of foundations, community foundations, family offices, and, more often now, health systems and universities funding civic work under other names. None of that money is unlimited, and none of it belongs to public media by default. A founder would list every one of them and be honest about which have ever funded media and which never will.
Then the commercial base. Underwriting works best when it follows the audience, meaning local businesses whose customers are the people watching and listening. It’s worth asking how many of those businesses there are, what they already spend to reach that audience, and whether a station’s underwriting list reflects the local economy or just its own history of relationships.
Then the competition, which is the part we tend to skip because it feels unseemly. The local nonprofit newsroom, the symphony, the food bank, and the public radio station down the road are all asking the same households and the same foundations. That isn’t a reason to stop asking. It’s a reason to know where you stand in line before you build a budget that assumes you’re first.
Finally, earned capacity, which is the only one public media controls directly, and the one it most consistently undervalues. Tower leases, spectrum sharing, facility rentals, engineering and master control services, and content licensing tend to show up as a line or two near the bottom of the budget, handled by whoever has time. They should be treated as a strategic pillar. A station that owns infrastructure other organizations need is sitting on revenue that doesn’t depend on a pledge break, a sponsor’s marketing budget, or a foundation’s shifting priorities. For most stations this is the smallest piece today. It’s also the one with the most room to grow, and the only one that gets stronger as the rest of the market gets tighter.
Add those five together and you get something public media has rarely had: a number for enough. Not a ceiling on ambition, but the size and scope this community can carry on its own, year after year, without a rescue appeal. I’ve argued that Too Big to Fail protection should go only to institutions that are genuinely irreplaceable, and that they should have to pass a civic stress test to earn it. Knowing your number for enough is how a public media station passes that test.
That number will almost never match the need. In most places, and especially in rural ones, it will fall short, sometimes far short. That’s not a failure of the exercise. It’s the point of it. The distance between what a community can afford and what it needs is real, and for nearly 60 years it was covered quietly. Now it can be named, and a named gap is something funders can see, price, and choose to close on purpose.
But be honest about who those funders are. In a metro area with community foundations, family philanthropy, and a deep commercial base, some of the gap can be closed locally. In much of rural America it can’t. There’s no local foundation, the household wealth isn’t there, and the business base is thin. For those places, closing the gap means statewide civic funds, pooled vehicles like the Public Media Bridge Fund, and state appropriations. Some states are already moving: Maryland’s fiscal 2027 budget documents note that CPB support to stations would be eliminated, even as the state’s proposed public broadcasting allowance rose to $48.4 million. Naming the gap doesn’t make rural stations responsible for closing it. It makes the case, clearly and in numbers, for who should.
Pick Your Engine
The five capacities tell you more than how big you can be. They tell you what kind of business you are.
Most public media organizations are trying to be two at once. On one side of the building sits a development shop. It thinks in relationships and stewardship, talks about members and donors, and measures success by retention and lifetime giving. On the other side sits a sales team. It thinks in pipelines and rate cards, talks about reach and demographics, and measures success by the quarter. Each has its own staff, its own systems, and its own description of the people the station serves. Neither is wrong, but they are different businesses, and they want different things from the same audience.
For a long time that arrangement was survivable. Federal money paid for the overlap, and a station could run both engines at half throttle and still keep the lights on. That cushion is gone, and running two revenue cultures now means paying for both and getting the full benefit of neither.
The underwriting side has its own ceiling, too. A noncommercial license limits what a sponsor can say on air, so public media is always competing for commercial dollars with one hand tied, against outlets with no such limits. There are markets where that trade still works, where the audience is valuable enough and the local business base is deep enough that a sales-led station can thrive. But that’s a finding you reach by looking at the market, not an assumption you inherit from the org chart.
Some stations have a third option they rarely think of as an engine at all: the balance sheet. A station that owns its building, its tower site, or its spectrum, or that manages an endowment, is sitting on assets most startups would envy. Too often those assets are treated as a safety net, something to draw on when the other engines sputter. And tellingly, few stations have anyone whose job is to make them productive. There’s a development director and a sales manager, but rarely an asset manager or a business development lead, so millions of dollars in potential revenue sit unmanaged, overseen part-time by a CFO and an engineer who have other jobs. A founder would treat those assets as a business. Space can be leased, towers shared, and facilities turned into hubs other organizations pay to use. The goal is for owned assets to earn enough to cover their own costs, so every dollar the endowment releases goes to the mission rather than the overhead. For a station with real assets, the balance sheet may be the most reliable engine it has, and the least used.
This is what the affordability assessment is really for. If the households and institutions in your core market have deep capacity, you’re a philanthropic business, and everything else should serve that engine. If the commercial base and earned revenue are where the capacity sits, you’re a sales business, and membership becomes a loyalty program rather than the main event. If your assets are your advantage, the balance sheet leads. Whatever you choose, the other lines don’t disappear. They get simplified, shared with other stations, or handed to someone who does them better.
You can keep several revenue lines. You can’t run several revenue cultures.
A startup picks its business model before it builds anything else, and a 60-year-old startup has to do the same, even if it means admitting it has been running two or three companies under one roof and staffing none of them fully.
Know a station leader, board member, or development director wrestling with this? Send it their way.
From Members to Friends
If you want to see a 60-year-old startup pick its engine in public, look at Colorado. (Technically, Rocky Mountain PBS signed on in 1956, which makes it closer to a 70-year-old startup. Somehow that only strengthens the point.)
Rocky Mountain Public Media runs Rocky Mountain PBS, KUVO Jazz, and THE DROP, and soon KUNC and The Colorado Sound as well. Under its CEO, Amanda Mountain, it’s attempting something most stations only talk about: rebuilding its relationship with its audience from the ground up. The organization calls it the Friendship Business Model, and it defines belonging along five dimensions: whether people feel welcome, known, included, supported, and connected. The idea, as I understand it, is that relationship depth, rather than revenue, is the measure that matters most, and that financial support follows when a community feels heard.
What makes this more than a slogan is the operation behind it. RMPM’s statewide civic engagement work runs through three programs. Above the Noise pairs public media screenings with facilitated small-group conversations, with topics drawn from listening sessions and insights sent back to local newsrooms. Ambassador64 builds a network of trusted local connectors to strengthen two-way relationships between Coloradans, their newsrooms, and RMPM. Community Voices shares Coloradans’ own stories with ethnic media partners, translated into Spanish and Mandarin.
In startup terms, that’s product and distribution built together. And Ambassador64 may be the most interesting answer I’ve seen to geographic blindness. Instead of trying to staff every county its signal touches, RMPM appears to be reaching them through people who already live there. Whether that network can carry real weight, in coverage and in giving, is one of the most useful experiments in public media right now.
The language is shifting too. Mountain’s CEO communiqués have opened with “Dear Friends,” and a recent RMPM job announcement on LinkedIn talks about content connecting with “our friends across the state.” But the donation page hasn’t caught up. It still says a gift of any amount makes you a member and walks you through membership levels. I don’t count that against them. It’s what an institution looks like halfway through rebuilding its business. The inherited system still runs the checkout while the new one is being built around it.
Two harder decisions show how seriously RMPM is treating the question of enough. The first is geographic. In March, RMPM completed the sale of its Steamboat Springs TV license, KRMZ, for $200,000, ending nearly two decades of full-power PBS service there. That’s exactly the kind of choice geographic blindness makes so hard: giving up a place the signal reached because the federal cuts forced a choice. The second is scale. RMPM’s acquisition of the owner of KUNC and The Colorado Sound won federal approval this month. In a May op-ed, Mountain and KUNC’s Tammy Terwelp wrote that the combined organization would be one of Colorado’s largest membership organizations, with nearly 140,000 people from every county. Among the operations the two organizations said they would share: HR, finance, and fundraising. That last one is a revenue culture being merged, not just a newsroom.
That’s where the friendship model meets its hardest test, and the test starts now. KUNC laid off 10 people, about a quarter of its staff, in September 2025, months before the merger was announced. When the deal became public, some KUNC staff were excited, while others worried about losing independence. One warned that listeners who think of the station as a friend might rebel if it were absorbed. The merger announcement said there were no plans to reduce staff, which matters. But the underlying tension doesn’t go away with a press release. A friendship model is built on intimacy, and a merger is built on scale. Whether RMPM can grow the network without thinning the relationships that make it valuable is the real test of whether belonging is a business model. Every station leader considering consolidation should be watching, because they’ll face some version of it.
The Case Against All of This
I’d be doing the thing I’m criticizing if I didn’t take the objections seriously, so here they are, in roughly the order I’d hear them at a station board meeting.
The first is that sizing to affordability abandons the people public media exists to serve. Rural counties, poor neighborhoods, and tribal communities will always need more than they can pay for, and that was the whole point of a federal appropriation. It’s a fair objection, and it’s the one I take most seriously. But look at what the current approach actually delivers to those communities: a signal that reaches them, a newsroom too thin to cover them, and a fundraising apparatus that mostly ignores them because the donors are elsewhere. Sizing to affordability doesn’t mean walking away. It means being honest about what the local base can carry, and then naming the rest as a gap that someone, whether a foundation, a state, or a pooled fund, has to decide to close on purpose.
A hidden gap gets filled with good intentions. A named gap can get filled with money.
The second is that belonging doesn’t pay the bills. A board can’t deposit a friendship score. “No money, no mission” cuts both ways, and a relationship-first model can look a lot like the old rescue appeal in nicer clothes. This one has teeth, and it’s why the friendship model is still an experiment rather than a proven answer. The test is simple to state and hard to pass: do the people who feel most welcomed, known, and connected actually give more, stay longer, and upgrade faster? If they do, belonging is a business model. If they don’t, it’s a very good engagement program that still needs a business model underneath it. The stations trying this deserve credit for running the experiment in public, and scrutiny until the results come in.
The third is that you can’t merge a friendship. Consolidation is where much of the savings in public media will come from over the next few years, and consolidation is exactly where relationships break. As the Colorado case shows, that’s not nostalgia. It’s a real risk to the revenue a merger is supposed to protect. The answer isn’t to avoid mergers. It’s to treat the relationship as the asset being acquired, and to structure the combined organization so the smaller station’s community still recognizes the friend it signed up for.
The fourth, and the one I expect to hear most, is that diversification is how nonprofits survive. Every fundraising consultant, funder, and capacity-building program in the country says some version of it. Don’t depend on one source of money. Spread your risk. I agree with every word of it, and I don’t think it contradicts anything here. Diversification is about revenue lines. You should have several, so that no single funder, program, or sponsor can sink you. What I’m arguing against is running several revenue cultures: a development operation and a sales operation competing for the same leadership attention, the same data, and the same audience, each at half strength. A philanthropic engine can still draw on individual gifts, major donors, foundations, events, and sustainers, and that’s real diversification inside one culture. A sales engine can still keep a loyal membership base as a loyalty program. The mistake isn’t having many sources of money. It’s organizing the whole institution around two different ideas of who the audience is.
None of these objections is foolish, and none of them is fatal. They are the questions a serious leader should expect to answer out loud. That’s the point, really. A startup doesn’t get to skip the hard questions because its mission is good. Neither does a 60-year-old one.
What a Focused Revenue Operation Looks Like
Once a station knows its engine, the rest of the operation has a job: serve that engine, and stop competing with it.
That starts with the parts of the business public media has treated as overhead rather than revenue. The infrastructure is the obvious one. Transmitters, master control, and engineering are expensive to run alone and much cheaper to share. As I’ve argued before, shared and cloud-based infrastructure can cut those costs dramatically, and a station that runs it well can become the service others join. Shared services are earned revenue that doesn’t require a single underwriting spot or pledge break.
Then there’s the content itself. When I audited 352 public TV and radio stations to measure how they manage AI crawler access, the median station scored zero on protection, and not one had published machine-readable terms for how its content could be used. Sixty years of local programming, archives, and reporting is sitting open by default, not by decision. For a philanthropic station, that archive is part of its story and its value to donors. For a sales-led station, it’s inventory. Either way, a founder would never leave the company’s most distinctive asset unguarded because nobody had gotten around to deciding what it was worth.
And then there’s consolidation, which is where many of the biggest revenue decisions in public media will be made over the next few years. A merger is a business decision before it’s anything else, and the right question isn’t whether two stations survive together but which community functions the combined organization can actually afford to keep. It’s also where geographic blindness does the most damage. Every merger enlarges the footprint, and a bigger map makes it even easier to confuse reach with a market.
None of this is exotic. It’s what any organization does once it knows what business it’s in. Public media has simply had the luxury of not deciding.
Don’t Burn the Old Engine
There’s a version of this argument that gets people hurt, so let me be clear about what it doesn’t mean.
It doesn’t mean canceling the pledge drive. It doesn’t mean walking into a staff meeting and announcing that half the coverage area isn’t a viable market. And it doesn’t mean betting payroll on a model nobody has tested. A startup can move fast because it has nothing to lose yet. A 60-year-old startup has people, obligations, and a community that already depends on it, and that changes the order of operations.
Run the old engine hot while you test the new one small.
The inherited engine, whether that’s pledge, membership, underwriting, or all three, keeps funding the organization at full strength while the new one proves itself. You don’t cut it back to make room for the future. You protect it, because it’s paying for the experiment. The new engine starts as a pilot, in one segment of the audience, one part of the service area, or one revenue line, with a budget the organization can afford to lose.
Before the pilot starts, the board and the leadership team agree on what proof looks like and when they’ll check. That might be retention rates, revenue per relationship, cost to serve, or whatever the new engine is supposed to improve. If it hits the mark, money and people move toward it in stages. If it doesn’t, you’ve learned something at a price you could afford, and the old engine never missed a beat. Either way, nobody is asked to trust a strategy on faith. For a while, you will be running two engines. The difference is that one has an end date.
That’s what I see in Colorado. RMPM’s language has moved toward friends, but the donation page still says “member.” Critics might call that inconsistent. I’d call it sequencing. The inherited system keeps processing gifts while the new one earns the right to replace it.
Geography needs the same care, and more of it, because it’s where people feel it personally. Telling a reporter that the county they cover isn’t a viable market lands as your work doesn’t matter, and that’s almost never what the math actually says. The more honest message is that the organization is changing how it serves a place, not whether it does. Some communities will be served by staff. Others will be served through partners, shared content, and local connectors. The signal keeps reaching everyone, while the strategy decides where to concentrate.
The best way to avoid a staff revolt is to not hand staff the conclusion. Show them the numbers. Let the newsroom and the development team see the market math together, early, before decisions are made. People who help size the market rarely feel ambushed by what it says. People who hear about it in an all-hands meeting almost always do.
And when the math does mean hard choices, say so plainly and early. The most corrosive thing a leader can do in a transition is promise that nothing will change and then change it. Staff can handle bad news. What they can’t handle is finding out that the strategy was decided months before anyone told them.
Keep the lights on while you rewire the house. It’s slower than a founder would like. It’s also how a 60-year-old institution gets to see 70.
What the Board Owes the Job
Most of this piece is addressed to the people who run public media organizations. But almost none of it can happen without the people who govern them.
Defining enough isn’t a management task. It’s a governance decision, and it’s one of the most important a board will ever make, because it sets the size of everything else. Choosing an engine is the same. A CEO can recommend it, but only a board can commit the institution to it, protect it through the first bad quarter, and resist the pull back toward trying to be everything at once.
That’s a lot to ask of boards that already struggle with strategy. Across nonprofit news, only 10 percent of leaders say their board is very effective at long-term strategy, even though two-thirds call it one of the board’s most critical jobs. Public media boards have had federal money to paper over that weakness. They don’t anymore.
Boards also own the gap. The difference between what a community can afford and what it needs is the strongest case a station can make to funders, but only if the board is willing to say the number out loud and stand behind it. That takes a kind of candor boards haven’t always been asked for, because federal money made it unnecessary.
The best public media boards I’ve seen do three things well. They’re honest about the math, even when it’s uncomfortable. They’re clear about what the organization is for, even when that means letting go of things it used to do. And they give their leaders enough room to build, because a startup that has to justify every experiment before it runs isn’t a startup. It’s a committee.
Why Anyone Would Take the Job
So, back to the question. Why would anyone want to lead a public media organization right now, with everything stacked against it?
Because almost nobody else gets this job. Most leaders inherit a business that’s already been defined, a market that’s already been sized, and a model they’re expected to run. Public media leaders are inheriting 60 years of trust, relationships, infrastructure, and community permission, and then being told to figure out the business from scratch. That’s hard. It’s also the rarest opportunity in local media.
The leaders who get it right will be the ones who can hold both halves of the job. They’ll keep public media’s oldest habit, sizing the need, because that’s what makes it public. And they’ll learn the habit it never had to develop, sizing the market, because that’s what will let it last. They’ll name the gap between the two out loud and ask funders to close it on purpose. They’ll pick an engine. They’ll stop mistaking the signal for the community.
A startup sizes the market. Public media sizes the need. The next generation of public media leaders will have to do both.
That’s why I still use the line, even when it gets a pause instead of a laugh. It’s not a metaphor anymore. It’s a 60-year-old startup, and its first job is finding out what enough looks like.
Your turn. If you lead, fund, or govern a public media organization: which engine is yours, and has anyone ever sized the market you’re in? And if you think I’ve got the diversification question wrong, I want to hear that too. Tell me in the comments.
Transparency note: I served as COO and CCO at Lehigh Valley Public Media and have no current role there. The American Press Institute published Rocky Mountain Public Media’s own account of its Friendship Business Model and Ambassador64, and I’ve talked with Amanda Mountain about AI leadership challenges. I also built the tool used in the 352-station audit mentioned above.


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